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STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The language is almost 
identical and provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized. 
TABLE OF CASES 
AND AUTHORITIES 
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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Authority for said appeal is found within the confine of Rule 26 
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Utah State Constitution 
Article 1, Section 12; Utah Code Annotated Section 77-1 6(g); and 
Section 78-2-2 (i) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of her motion 
to suppress evidence. The question is whether the officer here had 
justification to search her person affects based on observing she 
being in possession of a dollar bill and her passenger a butane 
lighter. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The defendant is charged with Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with the Intent to Distribute. The date of the offense 
alleged is May 2, 2004. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The defendant 
challenged the stop and further detention of the defendant 
specifically the search of her person and property. Defendant 
alleged a violation of her rights as guaranteed by our Constitutions 
protecting her from unreasonable searches and seizure. The trial 
court ruled found that this was a level three detention but the officer 
had probable cause to conduct the search. 
The Court denied defendant's motion from the bench without 
written findings. However, the Court did note that the officer must 
have probable cause to search the defendant's car— a level three 
stop. Motion to suppress hearing, Page 37 Line 6-9. However, the 
Court found the officer did have probable cause. The probable cause 
was based on two legal acts: 1) defendant possessing a rolled up 
dollar bill and 2) the passenger holding butane lighter. Motion to 
Suppress Hearing, Page 38 Line 17-25. 
The defendant, with the stipulation of the Prosecution and with 
concurrence of the Court, preserved the issue respecting the denial 
of her motion to suppress. Defendant entered this "Sery Plea" on 
December 1, 2005. 
FACTUAL STATEMENT 
Defendant motions this Court to suppress evidence herein. 
Defendant asserted that the officers herein conducted an illegal stop/ 
search of the defendant. Defendant contends that this is in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I 
Section 14, Utah State Constitution. 
On May 2, 2004, the officer stopped to check a blue 1990 
Chevrolet Camaro on SR 6, milepost 210. The officer's initial 
approach was at 7:55 a.m. Evidentiary Hearing Page 25 Line 4. The 
approach, search and then detention continued till approximately 
10:00 a.m. Evidentiary Hearing Page 25 Line 13. 
The defendant was in the driver's seat and a male was in the 
passenger seat. The car was running. The car had pulled up to the 
convenience store next to a working phone booth. Page 20 Line 11-
12. The officer noted no criminal violations pulling almost directly 
behind the Camaro. Evidentiary Hearing, Page 20 Line 7-10. 
The officer approached the car. The female defendant was 
leaning over the center console. Evidentiary Hearing, Page 21 Line 
21. The officer saw an object in her hand. As she responded to the 
officer's tap on the window, the officer noted that an object dropped 
from her hand. He noted it to be a rolled up dollar bill. Evidentiary 
Hearing, Page 22 Line 1. He saw in the passenger's hand butane 
lighter and napkin. Evidentiary hearing Page 22 Line 7. 
The officer believed the lighter to be paraphernalia. Evidentiary 
Hearing, Page 23 Lines 4-6; Page 23 Lines 14-16. At page 24 lines 
15-21 . He stated: 
Defense Counsel: And you told them at that time, well, tell me 
again what you said about the butane lighter. Line 15. 
Officer: I said I recognized this lighter as 
paraphernalia in my training and experience, I'm going 
to ask you to step from the car-
Defense Counsel: Okay. 
He, however, conceded that the lighter and dollar bill has many 
legal uses; neither item was necessarily paraphernalia. Evidentiary 
Hearing, Page 32 Line 19-23. Page 22 Line 14. Page 23 Lines 20-22. 
Based on the officer's conclusion that the lighter was 
paraphernalia, the officer then asked the defendant driver and the 
passenger to step outside the car. They submitted to his authority. 
Evidentiary Hearing Page 23 Line 7. He then commences a search 
of the car including their personal property. 
The trial court found the stop initially to be a level one stop as 
the officer approached the car. The Court further found that no 
detention had been made at that point. 
However, the Court noted that when the officer ordered them 
from the car, the detention had risen to a level three stop requiring 
probable cause. Evidentiary Hearing Page 37 Line 6-9. The trial 
court found that the officer's search was not a Terry' search or level 
two encounter. The State agreed that the search was a level three 
detention. Evidentiary Hearing, Page 37 Line 22. 
Contrary to the Court and prosecutor's position, the officer 
conceded that he did not have probable cause to arrest. Evidentiary 
Hearing, Page 23 Line 24 through Page 24 Line 2. The officer did 
not present any safety concerns respecting any weapons. 
No consent was given. She merely submitted to the officer's 
command to step from the car. Evidentiary Hearing Page 24 Line 8-
14. 
Defendant contends that the possession of a lighter does not 
constitute probable cause to arrest nor search independent of arrest. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly ruled that the officer escalated to 
the detention to a level three detention requiring a finding of 
probable cause to search. 
The officer's observations of a rolled up dollar bill, a 
lighter and a napkin do not equal probable cause to search. Both 
acts are legal alone or together. 
Parallel to the escalation of the encounter from a level 
one to a level three detention, a parallel mandate requires an officer 
to possess additional cause. Probable cause must be present to 
curtail an individual's freedom as here. 
This Court should find that legal conduct alone or 
together can never justify probable cause. 
DETAILED ARGUMENT 
The defendant asserts the search of the car by officers herein 
was in violation of the defendants constitutional rights granted to the 
defendant by the United States Constitution and the Utah State 
Constitution. 
PRESUMPTION OF UNREASONABLENESS 
Both Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The language is almost 
identical and provides as follows: 
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized. 
The balance between the public interest and the individual 
Constitution guaranteed right, personal security and privacy, tilts in 
favor of freedom from police interference. Brown v. Texas, U.S. 47 
(1979). This Court has a responsibility to jealously guard the rights 
of the citizens of this State against a violation of their civil liberties. 
State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
LEVEL OF ENCOUNTERS 
As a general framework, there are three differing levels of 
police encounters with the public. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 
617 (Utah 1987). State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah.Ct.App. 
1989). Each level has differing legal significance. Each requires a 
differing and corresponding level of cause. State v.Naranio, 2005 Ut 
App 281. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
A level one citizen encounter with a law enforcement official is 
consensual — wherein a citizen voluntarily responds to non-coercive 
questioning by an officer. The trial court found the initial approach 
to the defendant's care to be a level one encounter. 
A level two encounter involves an investigative detention or a 
detention authorized under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
Although it is a Fourth Amendment seizure, probable cause is not 
required. Rather, when "specific and articulable facts and rational 
inferences give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is 
committing a crime, an officer may initiate an investigative detention 
without consent. The detention should be brief and non-intrusive. 
State v. Naranio, 2005 Ut App 281. State v. Deitman, 739P.2d616, 
617 (Utah 1987). State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). 
Terry v. Ohio limits the police officer to a "search" of a person 
that the officer reasonably believes (1) is involved in a crime; (2) is 
armed; and (3) is presently dangerous to the officer, the public, or the 
person to be searched. Moreover, "[a] search for weapons in the 
absence of probable cause to arrest. . . must, like any other search, 
be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation," 
and cannot stray into a general search for evidence of wrongdoing. 
State v. Naranio, 2005 Ut App 281. The officer had no safety 
concerns. 
Here the officer ordered the defendant from her car and 
required her to submit her property to search. This search exceeded 
any authorization under Terry v. Ohio. See also State v. Naranio, 
2005 Ut App 281. State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d 706. 
The trial court found this encounter escalated from a level 
one to a level three detention. A level three encounter is 
characterized as highly intrusive (searching personal property) or 
lengthy detention (exceeding two hours here). 
At level three, the officer must have probable cause to justify 
the search the defendant's car and property. To justify this greater 
intrusion upon personal liberty, greater cause is mandated. 
The legal standard is 'probable cause' that a criminal offense 
has occurred versus a 'reasonable suspicion' that a person maybe 
committing a crime. 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
The trooper's testimony was that his probable cause was 
based solely on him seeing the passenger in possession of butane 
lighter, he deemed paraphernalia. Upon seeing the same, he felt he 
had authority to search for additional paraphernalia. He had also see 
dollar bill falling from her hand and starting to unfurl. The passenger 
was also holding a napkin. No controlled substances were noted. 
The search was for the purpose of locating paraphernalia other than 
the lighter. 
To justify this search, the officer must have probable cause to 
believe that the suspect has committed or is committing an offense. 
Probable cause determinations are reviewed under an "'objective 
standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences [that can] fairly . . . be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and 
prudent person in [the officer's] position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense"' for which he was 
arrested . State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983). 
'We examine the events leading up to the arrest, and then 
decide ' whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of 
an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to' probable cause." 
Maryland v. Prinqle. 540 U.S. 366, 124 S.Ct. 795, 800 (2003). 
As noted in Maryland v. Pringle, the probable-cause standard 
is incapable of precise definition. However, "the substance of all the 
definitions of probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of 
guilt", and that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect 
to the person to be searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 
85, 91 (1979). 
The defendant thereby perceives the question here is whether 
the officer had reasonable ground for belief of guilt. Here, the belief 
in guilt is based on the observations of the passenger possessing a 
butane lighter (having multiple innocent uses) and the defendant 
dropping a dollar bill unfurling. 
Do these limited observations formulate a reasonable ground 
of guilt? Do the simple possession of a dollar bill (rolled up or not) 
and a butane lighter constitute a criminal offense? No. Should legal 
acts ever justify a finding of probable cause? 
There is nothing observed which would formulate any grounds 
to arrest for any offense. To the officer's observations no offense 
was committed. A combination of legal acts may create a suspicion 
of wrongdoing, but they should never create probable cause to 
arrest. 
At best, the observations are a basis for the officer' suspicion. 
Based on this suspicion, his authority is limited to diligently pursuing 
his investigation that is likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions. He 
cannot conduct a general search based on a suspicion, reasonable 
or not. 
In State v. Naraio. this Court held that the officer may conduct 
a 'Terry' frisk based on reasonable cause but he may not extend the 
search beyond a search for weapons. The search of the defendant 
for evidence is never authorized under the level two encounters. The 
officer there became concerned that Narajo might be concealing 
something around the area of his waist. He then lift Narajo's right 
pant leg, causing a bindle to drop to the ground. The purpose of the 
search there was beyond the search for weapons and for weapons. 
The Court found that search to be illegal. 
In State v. Chism, 2005 UT App 41, 107 P.3d 706, the officer 
detained Chism to conduct a computer check on his identification. 
The officer's only basis for detaining Chism was the suspicion that 
Chism was underage to possess tobacco. Chism had produced 
identification dispelling a reasonable person's suspicion. This Court 
concluded that no reasonable basis to further detain Chism existed 
after he presented identification. For the officer to go farther, the 
office had to have additional cause. 
In State v. Hechtle, 2004 UT App 96, 89 P.3d 185, this Court 
found that the officer lacked probable cause to believe that the 
defendant was driving with a drug metabolite. There the officer had 
stopped the defendant for speeding. The officer had noted the 
presence of air fresheners and the occupants had started to smoke 
cigarettes as the officer approached. The office than ran warrants 
check on the driver to find none. The officer than noted that the driver 
had a prescription eye glass restriction on his license. Although the 
was wearing sunglasses, the driver advised that he just had eye 
surgery removing the necessity for the glasses. 
The officer then continued further. He had the defendant 
remove his sunglasses and noted red eyes. The officer also noted 
the presence of a green tinge on the driver's tongue and droopy 
eyelids. 
The trooper noted no visible drug paraphernalia, no signs of 
recent drug use, and no odor of marijuana emanating from either the 
car or from Hechtle. The Court assumed the trooper's suspicions of 
drug use may have been reasonable but noted the officer did nothing 
to confirm his suspicions. He then arrested the defendant for driving 
with a drug metabolite. The trooper performed no field sobriety tests 
and made no attempt to involve a certified DRE to validate his 
suspicions. 
The Court concluded that to justify this arrest, probable cause 
was needed to believe a crime had been committed. Taken as a 
whole, the Court found the facts articulated by the trooper weighed 
against finding of probable cause. This Court found the presence of 
multiple air fresheners and other masking agents, as well as the 
condition of Hechtle eyes may have been suggestive of possible drug 
use, but they did not create probable cause to arrest. 
Here the officer commences a probable cause search of the 
car and defendant's property based on much less—butane lighter 
and a dollar bill. There was no suggestion of any odor indicative of 
illegal drug use and no other indicators were present. 
The probable cause was limited to legal behavior—dollar bill 
and a lighter. Probable cause should never be based on legal 
conduct. 
CONCLUSION 
The officer here searches the defendant's property based on 
suspicion of possible wrongdoing. To search her property required 
probable cause to justify an arrest. The arrest was based on two 
legal acts; possessing a dollar bill and her companion a butane 
lighter. Neither factors are illegal alone or together. 
Although the Court found probable cause present, the officer 
conceded he lacked probable cause to arrest. He conceded that 
possessing either the dollar bill or the lighter is not criminal and could 
not justify an arrest. 
This Court should reverse the decision of the trial court. This 
conviction is based on evidence obtained through a violation of the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights and Art. I Section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution. Legal conduct may create cause to suspect 
but it should never create a basis to arrest. 
DATED this 29th day of AuausLJ2005. 
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MR. CARTER: I'll submit it on the brief, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Low? 
MR. LOW: If he's submitting, just as to that last 
point whether consent was requested or not I think he had a 
level-2 basis anyway. 
THE JUDGE: Well you can't, a level-2 is then you, 
you can do further investigation. But to make a search you 
have to have probable cause or you have to have consent. 
Correct? 
MR. LOW: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: So did he have, did he have probable 
cause or did he have consent? 
MR. LOW: I would say he had both. And he 
certainly had probable cause regardless, Your Honor. I 
don't know how the evidence that he observed there could be 
anything but probable cause. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. I mean level-2, level-2 is, 
reasonable suspicion. 
MR. LOW: Is reasonable suspicion. That's correct. 
THE JUDGE: So this would have to be level-3 
really. Okay. 
MR. LOW: Okay 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: The Court having heard the testimony 
at preliminary hearing, having heard further testimony here 
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today, having reviewed the memorandums submitted by counsel, 
the Court does find that the initial contact between the 
officer and the individuals in the vehicle was a level-1 
stop. An officer has those type of stops all the time with 
respect to safety questions or other, other reasons to assist 
and help the public along the road. And he can, as long as 
he doesn't detain them or stop them, here they were already 
stopped. The videotape and the pictures if, if these 
individuals wanted to have left, to leave I don't think that 
they were prevented from doing so. It might have been a 
little bit difficult but they were clearly not to the level 
as cited by some of the case law where someone has pinned you 
in or where, where they've got their, the officer's got their 
lights on indicating that he wants them to not move from the 
area. The officer then approaches, taps on the window, 
makes certain observations that they are leaned forward in 
towards the console area. They... He then startles them. 
He observes the defendant Ms. Griffith raise her hand, she 
has something in her hand, he sees a rolled up currency fall 
from her hand. And he also observes in the hand of the other 
person a napkin and a butane lighter. Clearly those items 
in and of themselves are innocent and they have innocent 
reasons. But taken together based upon the officer's 
training and experience, he's testified that he's observed 
similar items with respect to drug usage. 
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And given those circumstances the Court finds that 
he had probable cause to believe that they were drug 
paraphernalia and could therefore make a search to determine 
to find those items. He found those items. He then had 
probable cause to make a further search with respect to 
additional paraphernalia, found the black bag which contained 
the methamphetamine. If, if he hadn't made the initial, 
those observations of, of together of the rolled up bill and 
the paraphernalia and their leaning towards each other 
towards the console and from his training and experience that 
that is probable cause or potential drug use, he would not 
have had the right to have requested them to exit the 
vehicle. But the Court finds that he did. Therefore, 
denies the motion to suppress. 
MR. LOW: Thank you, Judge. 
THE JUDGE: This matter is set for trial in a 
couple of weeks. 
MR. CARTER: December 1st if I recall correctly. 
THE JUDGE: That's a week from next— 
MR. CARTER: Next Wednesday, a week from this 
coming Wednesday I think. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. Okay. Thank you. 
MR. LOW: Thank you, Judge. Motion to withdraw 
exhibits I guess. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Carter, do you want your 
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